Part 11 Remarkable Results for the Finnish Army

Why was the Finnish army able to achieve this remarkable result?

There are many reasons for the surprising result, some military and some political. The Russian army was given a limited time in which to achieve its goals, the Russian leadership was very aware of the fact that the Second World War was to be decided in Berlin, not in Helsinki. After the allied landing in Normandy the race for Germany was on and under no circumstances would Stalin accept that Berlin was not occupied by Russian troops. This meant that when the troops attacking the Finns were worn-out they were given only quite limited reinforcements, quite contrary, already after the conquest of Vyborg there started a gradual transfer of Russian troops away from the Finnish front down to the front against the Germans. This was probably a premature decision made in the erroneous belief that the Finnish army was already beaten and only mop-up operations and the occupation of Helsinki remained.
But even with the withdrawal started there was still a tremendous Russian advantage in numbers, roughly 6 to 1 in infantry and 40 to 1 in armour. At the initial breakthrough point the Russians had more guns per kilometre of front line than Montgomery had at El Alamein and most of that artillery was still available at Tali-Ihantala and at Suvanto. But the Finnish side had some advantages too: The terrain was mostly not ideal for armour and the new anti-tank weapons were deadly in that environment. Then there was the Finnish artillery that after some initial hiccups became superb. With its new fire-control system finally in place it could quickly get tremendous fire-power placed on any spot within range. Much has been written about the role of this artillery, often it has been described as the deciding factor. Important it certainly was but there were other factors too, easily forgotten. Memoirs and “I was there” stories always tell about on one hand the power of the own artillery, the stubbornness of the Finnish soldier and the absence of the own air force. This is of necessity a very skewed view of the whole picture. The man in the line could see for himself the results of the artillery fire, he saw the enemy tanks attacking him and he suffered under the repeated attacks by “Schturmoviks”, the Russian “Agricultural machine” of Finnish soldier vocabulary. What he didn’t see was the tanks that never reached him because they, their fuel supply or ammunition trains had been sent to kingdom come by the Stukas of detachment Kuhlmey, neither did he see those Schturmoviks that never reached him because they had been shot down by the fighters of the Finnish air force before ever reaching the frontline. Fact is that the combination of Finnish fighter units, that managed more or less to achieve air superiority, and Kuhlmeys Stukas and ground-attack FW190s was a force that wreaked tremendous losses on the Russian attackers, mostly well beyond the immediate frontline. Their impact on the final outcome has consistently been downplayed, partly because of the above mentioned visibility issues but probably partly because it has not been politically popular to say that a Luftwaffe unit played a key role in the eventual success of the Finnish defenders. Attitudes are however changing and Finnish TV has during the last year’s repeatedly aired interviews of detachment Kuhlmey pilots, including Kuhlmey himself. Finally it is possible to give honour were honour is due!
But regardless of all supporting forces, in the end it was, as always, the unglamorous foot soldier in his pothole, “the Grunt”, “der Landser” or the “Bushjonesy” (Finnish: “Puskajussi”) that was the deciding factor. He was the one that stood between the attacker and the civilians behind, without him every support activity would have been meaningless. The Finnish soldier had experienced three years of more or less static warfare and had some trouble in getting his wits together after the very rude awakening the Russian attack of the 9th of June. There started the “Rush through the Isthmus”, something usually viewed with some shame in Finland. Truth is, however, that it was a remarkably orderly retreat, as retreats go. There is no denying that it was quick, the loss of the VT-line almost before it had been manned was nothing to brag about and it all ended with the shameful loss of Vyborg, without any proper fight. But nevertheless it was an orderly retreat where most units retained all their heavy weapons and never lost their fighting value. The spirited, even if unsuccessful, counterattack by the Jaeger-brigade at Kuuterselkä and the stand by lieutenant colonel Ehrnrooths units at Siirainmäki, where they withstood all Russian attacks, clearly indicated that the Finnish army was far from beaten.
After two weeks of retreat events changed nature radically. In no small measure due to realization of the meaning of words by leaders like Colonel Savonjousi, who when reforming the remnants of his worn-out regiment told his men: “From here we won’t retreat. We simply cannot. The next line will be manned by our mothers, sisters, children and parents, the whole heart of our wide open country. This is where we will die. I have come here to die. The running is now finished, brothers.” The soldiers realized what they were fighting for and the traditional Finnish stubbornness took over; “Here I stand and, by God, no one is going to get me moved elsewhere until I say so!”
A further deciding factor was the abundant availability of modern short-range anti-tank weapons from very late June onwards. For the first time since the “Molotov-cocktails” of the Winter War the common foot soldier had available a weapon with which to take on any tank that dared to come close enough. And close in those days really meant close, 20m or less was the right distance for a “Panzerfaust”, not a very comfortable distance to be from a “Josef Stalin” assault gun hurling 6” shells in your direction. Those were the days for stout hearts! Seeing time and again such armoured monsters brought to a stop by daring fellow fighters had a tremendous impact on the fighting spirit of the average soldier.
Furthermore the arrival of fresh troops brought in from the Eastern Carelia area had a great impact. The worn out original defending units could be rested and refitted and suddenly the front line commanders even had reserves available!
To sum up: The Finnish army might have been unprepared mentally and materially, rusty and half asleep at the beginning of June but by early July it again was a well oiled fighting machine ready to take on all comers. The “Window of Opportunity” for the Russians had been slammed shut at the last possible moment.

(An interesting speculation here is: What would have happened if the Russians had started their attack on Eastern Carelia two weeks before the main attack on the Carelian Isthmus instead of the two weeks after they actually did?)

jcl