Was
the Continuation War Unavoidable?
If the analysis about the unavoidability or not of the Winter War was
fairly straightforward the questions around the Continuation War are far
more complicated. The simple answer after a shallow analysis would be
“No”, it was not unavoidable, it could easily have been avoided if
Finland had abstained from cooperation with the Germans and kept a
strictly neutral political course.
But then one is completely ignoring the environment prevailing in
1940-41 and demanding that Finland’s decision makers had had the
foresight to then make decisions based on the world of 1943-44.
Furthermore one ignores the external pressures on Finland and the
probable outcome of an alternate policy. E.g. it is to be assumed that
if Finland had resisted all approaches by Germany during the summer of
1940 Hitler would hardly in December of the same year have given a
negative response to Molotov’s demands that Russia gets a free hand to
finally solve the “Problem Finland”. What that solution had been,
and what impact it would have had on Finland during the ensuing war
between Germany and Russia is open to speculation. The fate of the
Baltic States is not encouraging. And finally the Russians handled their
relationship with Finland after the Winter War in a way that almost
seemed designed to foster a wish for revenge and drive Finland into the
arms of Germany.
Of course there is also the “War-monger theory” much favoured by
certain political circles. It bundles together the decisions and events
during 1940 and early 41 which eventually led to war with the decision
to continue the advance into Eastern Carelia and purports that that is
clear evidence that the whole war was intentionally started in order to
to grab the whole of Carelia and so further the old ultra nationalistic
vision of Greater Finland. Such a vision might politically be very
expedient but there is no evidence to confirm that the advance into
Eastern Carelia was anything but an idea borne out of premature
enthusiasm at the chance of regaining what was lost in the winter War.
If one accepts the historical events up to the winter 1940-41 as more or
less inevitable but still not necessarily leaving Finland without any
leeway in deciding its future course one can however discern a clear
breakpoint during the spring of 1941. Finland then had the final chance
of clearly expressing to the Germans if Finland was interested or not in
participating in the upcoming German war against the Soviet Union. This
was the point in time where it would have been possible to say “This
far but no further”. The risk for German retaliation in case of a
negative answer was small as a friendly, although non-cobelligerent
Finland was still much more of an asset to Germany than an antagonistic
Finland. But no clear statement was ever made. Much indicates that the
Finnish political leadership (but not necessarily the military
leadership?) thought they still had this peace-option available even on
the 22nd of June. But that probably was wishful thinking. The time for
declarations of neutrality had then passed long ago. The Russians gave
no indication of ever recognizing such a possibility, quite the
contrary; they saw themselves at war with Finland already a couple of
days before official Finland had made up its mind.
Public opinion in Finland during the spring 1941 was such that it would
have been extremely difficult for any government to explain why the
Finnish army stood inactive while the Germans conquered Russia and
hopefully eventually gave Finland back the areas lost in 1940. And in
1941 most people, not only in Finland, expected a German victory.
Obviously now was the right moment to “take back what was robbed from
us when we had to fight alone” and at the same time “get even for
the unfairness of the whole Winter War”.
There was not much room left for maneuvering by any government in such a
situation!
The military leadership probably quite early saw which way the wind was
blowing and laid their own plans and took their own decisions, not
always in full cooperation with the political leadership. By doing so
they unwittingly joined the forces pushing Finland into war
Looking back at that time one can see the Finnish leadership time and
again making decisions that at the moment they were made looked innocent
enough and were clearly made to promote peace but which in the end led
Finland into a situation where it no longer had control of its own
destiny, With other decisions earlier in the chain the end result might
have been quite different, later on the options available were very
limited..
In fact the infamous driftwood-theory might after all describe the
situation fairly well when not taken to the extreme: Finland was like a
boat which is suddenly is caught by a current and pulled into the
rushing waters of a rapid. Only by earlier keeping well away from the
dangerous current disaster could have been fully averted. When caught by
the current there still was a small chance to reach safety by prompt and
decisive action but when already in the rapids it was far too late. Then
the only thing to do was to hang for dear life on and try to avoid at
least the worst danger spots.
Conclusion about the Continuation War.
To sum up: The Continuation War was not unavoidable but the Finnish
leadership lacked the extraordinary skills needed to keep Finland out of
war in the turbulent events and pressures of 1940-41. Most of the
external pressures were pro-war and when furthermore the Finnish
population felt a great bitterness over the unfairness of the Winter War
and were not totally aversive to war there was an environment where few
governments would have been capable of acting differently than the
leaders of Finland did.
To Note.
For Amateur Historians and All Those Blaming Past Generations to Note:
“When you criticize decisions by past politicians try to remember that
they had to base their decisions on what they knew at that time, not on
what you know today.”
“No historical event is as simple as it seems, but neither is it as
complicated as you fear.”
“With all facts in front of you it is easy to understand history. The
problem is to recognize when you have all the facts.”
“History written by politicians often is not a story about what was
planned and what happened and why, it is a fable adapting or twisting
facts to force history to conform to or support a political dogma”
“History is mostly written by the victor and always by a survivor.”
For Politicians to Note:
“When elephants fight lesser creatures do best in keeping well
clear” (African proverb)
“Forced into a corner even a mouse will fight”
“The Right is worthless when the Might is not behind it”
“Relations between Major and Minor Powers are always handled on the
Major’s terms.
“History is events that are results of decisions. Ideologies make no
decisions, people do.”
For My Readers to Note:
This story is one perception of historical events that took place more
than half a century ago.
It is not necessarily any more accurate or correct than other
perceptions and nor are the conclusions drawn necessarily any more
correct than those made by others.
But it is mine.
Jan-Christian Lupander
Mojacar, Spain,
November 2005