These extensive articles were written by Jan-Christian Lupander and represent his views on the background and politics of the Winter War and the Continuation War. Mr. Lupander is a frequent contributor to the Nordic Boards Forum and has graciously allowed us to reprint his articles here.  Each section is extensive and very well written and we want to thank Mr. Lupander for allowing us to use them on this website. - mkregel (webmaster)

During the spring and summer 1940 the strategic situation in Europe was radically changed.
Germany first occupied Denmark and Norway and then in a spectacular show of Blitzkrieg conquered Holland, Belgium and France. Then followed a somewhat half-hearted attempt to conquer England but when the RAF was victorious in the “Battle of Britain” Hitler turned his attention eastwards. That meant that Finland gained quite a new position in the eyes of the German planners.
Contacts had already been re-established with Finland, but so far mostly on a commercial plane. Finland was able to export timber; nickel, copper and molybdenum (later) to Germany and so earn currency to buy primarily grain, which was sorely needed.
In the late summer of 1940 the Finnish military leadership was unexpectedly contacted by German colleagues that hinted that the German attitude to Finland was changing and sale of surplus war materials would be possible, especially if Finland was to grant transition rights to German troops to and from Norway. Naturally the Finnish political leadership, which was immediately informed of the proposal, found it most interesting Not only was the possibility to get modern weapons interesting in itself but the possibility of German troops stationed, at least temporarily, in Finland was a revolution that changed the country’s situation radically. Considering the risks to, even by mistake, have a clash between their own troops and the German troops in Finland the Russians most certainly would think twice before any invasion Furthermore, as it could be assumed that the possibility to transition would cease in case of an Russian occupation, it now was in the Germans interest to keep the Russians out of Finland, Finally Finland had got at least a straw to cling to!
After some political wrangling, including acquiescing to a very timely Russian demand for transition rights to their base in Hanko, agreement was reached and German troops started to travel to and from northern Norway through Finland
In this context it is ridiculous to start to speak about the nazi-friendliness of the Finnish government, With your back against the wall you are only too happy to accept help in any form from whomever might offer it; it’s only in legends and hero-worshiping stories where the shining knight involved in mortal combat proudly rejects offers of help from someone lacking the same lily-white morals as he himself purports to possess.
When one judges the decisions by the Finnish leadership during this period one has additionally to remember that the Germans had their own hidden agenda, they wanted Finland to join in with them in the forthcoming attack against Russia, and to that end they were prepared to use whatever tricks deemed necessary. As an example they on one hand temptingly offered food, to a country facing famine, while they on the other hand spread the rumour that the Ribbentrop agreement was probably about to be renewed, in which case Germany would possibly abandon Finland for good. The Finnish leadership was aware of this nature of the game but of course had difficulties in always sorting out the false rumours from the true ones.

The spring 1941
After the initial stage described above we now come to the most unclear, controversial and most argued about period in Finland’s recent history. Who knew what and who made the decisions based on what facts has been debated continuously since 1944.
The relatively “innocent” Finnish-Germany cooperation got quite a new dimension during the first five months of 1941.
To start with cooperation between the Finnish and German leadership continued at a relatively intensity on the political level but on the military side it started to have a life of its own.
In January the German military contacts in Finland started to talk about a “possible” German attack on Russia and sounding out Finland’s stand during such a conflict. There seems to have grown an unspoken understanding that Finland would probably participate and joint planning proceeded based on that assumption. What the political leadership really knew about these plans and how much they approved of them is unclear. An interesting key question is if there was political approval of the hostile operations Finnish armed forces then undertook already the night before the German attack started. E.g. the Finnish submarines were early that night ordered to lay mines outside harbours on the Russian islands in the Gulf of Finland.
When then the Finnish politicians talked about a total surprise, when Hitler in his speech later the same morning mentioned that the Finns stood shoulder to shoulder with the Germans in the attack, that claim has to be taken with a big grain of salt. That ignorant they couldn’t all have been! Who knew what has never been ascertained but the so often proposed “driftwood theory” according to which Finland just was like a piece of wood drifting on the stormy ocean of history is a little too much of a whitewashing job. That theory might be appropriate if limited to generally describe Finland’s history after the Winter War when the overwhelming external political forces rather than the country’s own actions determined the course taken. But not being able to determine the course is no excuse for not knowing one’s position at a given moment…

At war again
Some kind of semi-peace/semi-war condition continued for a couple of days after the 22 of June. Finland didn’t take any military action except sending troops to the Aland Islands, something that it was compelled by treaty to do. (Russia was party to that treaty but of course, treaty or no treaty, control of those Islands was a life or death question for Finland)
The Russians bombed the troop convoys to Aland and likewise attacked civil targets in a number of Finnish cities. For the Finnish government these bombings were a heaven-sent possibility to avoid having to declare war on Russia, instead it got away on the 25th of June by noting that a “State of war seems to exist between Finland and the Soviet Union”.

The real military operations started a couple of weeks later. The Finnish troops had been defensively grouped and had to regroup before offensive operations could start. This at least indicates that the Finnish army was not all intent on attack from the beginning.

jcl